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ABSTRACT
Chaos theory holds that systems act in unpredictable, nonlinear ways and that their behavior
can only be observed, never predicted. This is an informative model for an organization in crisis.
The West Virginia water contamination crisis, which began on January 9, 2014, fits the criteria of a
system in chaos. This study employs a close case study method to examine this case through the
lens of chaos theory and its tenets: sensitivity to initial conditions, bifurcation, fractals, strange
attractors, and self-organization. In particular, close attention is paid to emergent organizations
and how their embodiment of strange attractor values spurred the self-organization process for
this chaotic system.
KEYWORDS: Chaos theory; crisis communication; water contamination; West Virginia water
crisis

Crises, regardless of the form they take, present unique and challenging
circumstances for those affected to overcome. Be they natural disasters
or organizational crises, they are defined by three characteristics that
set them apart from other nonroutine events: threat, surprise, and a
short response time (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). An environmental disaster in the form of a leak, spill, or contamination meets these
requirements because there is little to no warning before it happens,
affected stakeholders are not expecting this departure from the norm,
and there is the added pressure of not only stopping the leak/spill but
also dealing with the contaminated area quickly to avoid exposure
to large numbers. The Bhopal disaster, BP Deepwater Horizon oil
spill, and Exxon Valdez oil spill are examples of previous accidental
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contamination events studied from a crisis communication perspective. A crisis in this form poses unique challenges, and those are only
compounded if the contamination affects the local food and/or water
supply. In addition to cleaning up the initial contamination, there are
also concerns about the long-term effects on the environment and on
those individuals exposed to the contaminant.
In January 2014, Charleston, West Virginia, experienced its environmental crisis in the form of a chemical spill that contaminated the
water supply and left 300,000 residents unable to do anything but flush
their toilets with the water in their homes. This water use ban lasted
approximately 2 weeks and required people to find alternate sources
for drinking water and ways to perform basic functions like bathing,
brushing their teeth, washing dishes and clothes, and providing water
for their pets. The organizations that should have provided pertinent
messages for self-protection failed to do so in a timely and clear manner, leaving affected stakeholders confused and unsure of how best to
protect themselves and loved ones. The bulk of the crisis communication tasks were taken up by small emergent organizations formed by
concerned and frustrated citizens. This unique circumstance, combined
with the magnitude of the event (it was the largest drinking water contamination in U.S. history at that time), makes the West Virginia case
ideal to study from a risk and crisis communication perspective. More
specifically, this case is examined through the lense of chaos theory
because its description of an unpredictable system and its tenets are
an insightful metaphor to apply to crisis events, which are nonlinear
and the complexity of which appears unpredictable (Tsoukas, 2005).
Chaos theory has long been used by scientists and mathematicians
to describe the systems and phenomena they observe. Chaos theory,
stated simply, holds that systems act in nonlinear, unpredictable ways.
The behavior they exhibit is dependent on the conditions surrounding
them, and this behavior can only be observed and described, never
predicted (Murphy, 1996). This makes sense when describing complex weather patterns, ecosystems, and difficult mathematical models,
hence why chaos theory is widely used by researchers in those fields.
However, as of late, it has come to the attention of social scientist researchers that chaos theory is a good model for describing the systems
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they study. Human systems act in just as unpredictable ways as other
systems. More specifically, crisis communication researchers see that
chaos theory is an excellent model for describing an organization in
crisis. The tenets of chaos theory—sensitivity to initial conditions,
bifurcation, fractals, strange attractors, and self-organization—can
all be observed throughout the life cycle of a crisis. Thus crisis communication researchers have created a body of literature that applies
chaos theory to crisis events (Freimuth, 2006; Horsley, 2014; Liska,
Petrun, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2012; Murphy, 1996; Seeger, 2002; Sellnow,
Seeger, & Ulmer, 2002). Though chaos theory did not originate in the
social sciences, communication scholars see the heuristic value in the
application of a scientific perspective to human systems (Berger &
Chaffee, 1987). The nature of the West Virginia water contamination
makes it a unique case to observe through the lens of chaos theory. This
study pursues two related research questions. First, to what extent were
the tenets of chaos theory observable during this crisis? Second, how
does a case with such a broad and lasting impact further advance our
understanding of crisis communication in chaotic circumstances? The
remainder of this article provides a review of literature, a summary of
the case, description of methods, and analysis of the case and ends with
a discussion of implications and conclusions that can be drawn from
this study.
Chaos and Crisis Communications
Chaos Theory

Chaos theory has its origins in the math and science disciplines. One
of its first uses was by the scientist Edward Lorenz, who used it to map
and explain complex weather patterns and systems. The main tenet of
chaos theory is that systems act in nonlinear and unpredictable ways.
Because of their inherent random behavior, it is impossible to accurately
predict the behavior of a chaotic system. Perhaps the best-known tenet
of chaos theory is the system’s sensitivity to initial conditions, which
is often referred to as the butterfly effect. Put simply, this supposition
implies that something as small and seemingly insignificant as the
flapping of a butterfly’s wings can have a much greater impact and can
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start a chain of events that leads to a large-scale event, such as a tidal
wave that devastates a coastal area.
This theory fits well when describing complex systems like the
weather, biological systems, and complex mathematical models, but as
of late, social scientist researchers are seeing the applicability of chaos
theory and the idea of unpredictable behavior to the systems they
study. As Murphy (1996) stated, “chaos theory attempts to understand
the behavior of systems that do not unfold in a linearly, predictable,
conventional, cause-and-effect manner over time” (p. 96). Murphy
wrote her seminal piece, published in the Journal of Public Relations,
and showed the clear connections between the tenets of chaos theory
and the systems often studied by social scientists and made a call for
researchers to extend this body of literature and use chaos theory in
their future research. Seeger (2002) echoed her sentiments in a followup piece published in the same journal. He argued that organizations
experiencing a crisis are an ideal model of a chaotic system and said
the field of risk and crisis communication was ideal for the application
of this theory. He pointed to each element of chaos theory—fractals,
bifurcation, strange attractors, and self-organization—and showed
how an organizational crisis contained each element across the crisis
life cycle. Herein, each of these components will be defined, explained,
and expanded—particularly in regard to strange attractors and selforganization. Finally, chaos theory is applied to the 2014 West Virginia
water contamination as an example of an ideal case that clearly exhibited
all tenets of a system in chaos.
Fractals. Mandlebrot (as cited in Murphy, 1996) defined fractals as
self-similar and repeating mathematical patterns. He often explained
the intricacy of fractals by asking his students to measure the coast of
Britain in various quantitative measures. When the coast was measured
in miles, there was a different measure than when done in feet, inches,
centimeters, grains of sand, and so on. This example demonstrated
the problem with using quantitative units of measurement. Rather,
Mandlebrot (as cited in Murphy, 1996) suggested fractals as a qualitative
measurement that can describe “the relative degree of complexity of an
object” (p. 100). Murphy also addressed the importance of considering
scope and scale and said that
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the difficulty of perceiving pattern in chaos relates to the scale at which
one views a phenomenon. . . . Chaos theorists note significant differences in the very structure and dimensionality of an object depending
on the observer’s standpoint and measuring tools. (p. 98)

Thus the object can look very different depending on the standpoint of
the individual. Horsley (2014) described fractals as changing with each
successive iteration, but the evolution of the pattern from beginning to
end can be observed when looking at the whole picture. In her examination of the Washington, D.C., sniper attacks, she said that at first it
was difficult to determine a fractal pattern among the sniper victims
because they were of different genders, ages, races, and so on, and the
killings happened at random times and in different places. However,
by observing the fractal sets from the point of view of the sniper who
was targeting his wife (who had a restraining order against him), it
became clear that he was targeting places like shopping malls and craft
stores, where he thought she would be, thus revealing the pattern to
his attacks (Horsley, 2014).
Sellnow, Seeger, and Ulmer (2002) noted the key difficulty with
fractals by observing their role in the case of the historic Red River
floods that affected residents in North Dakota and Minnesota. According to them, the problem was “the communication of excessive
confidence in a measurement system that lacked the precision needed”
(p. 276). In this case, they referred to the imprecise measurement
tools and system that had been previously used to estimate flood levels but in this case did not account for the sensitivity to initial conditions, such as ice blockages, that had rendered the measurement
system imprecise and irrelevant. However, because all the predictions had shown that flooding would be at a certain level, this was
communicated with confidence by meteorologists and a number of
other officials. Because of this, the area was wholly unprepared to
deal with the record-setting flood levels, exacerbating the chaos and
representing a failure of viewing a fractal pattern from the wrong perspective. These examples demonstrate the complexity of fractals and
the potential consequences of viewing the system from an incorrect
perspective.

178

getchell

Bifurcation. According to Freimuth (2006), “bifurcation is associated with a collapse of sensemaking. At these points, observers realize
that the routine ways of operating have collapsed” (p. 145). These are
points at which the system deviates from the established path and routine operations. In relation to the crisis life cycle, bifurcation could be
considered the beginning or initial phases of the crisis and the point
at which the system begins to act in a chaotic, unpredictable way. As
Seeger (2002) stated, “organizational crises are points of system bifurcation or radical change where a system’s direction, character, and/
or structure is fundamentally disrupted or departs from the previous
path” (p. 332). In some cases, this collapse in sense making can result
in what Weick (1993) referred to as a cosmology episode. A cosmology
episode is one in which people feel that “I’ve never been here before, I
have no idea where I am, and I have no idea who can help me” (p. 634).
In some instances, people and organizations respond to bifurcation by
sticking with routine procedures or what has worked in the past, but
as history and the literature have shown, for a system to pull itself out
of bifurcation/chaos, it must acknowledge that the current conditions
are new and unfamiliar and that the old ways of operating and functioning must be abandoned before the system can begin the process
of self-organization. As Venette, Sellnow, and Lang (2003) contended,
“crisis is a process of transformation in which the old system can no
longer be maintained” (p. 224). Thus bifurcation is marked by the
system deviating from normal operations and a failure of previously
effective interventions to get the system back on track. This was true
of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) after it experienced a disaster in the form of a coal ash spill that rained down tons of coal ash on
the town of Kingston, Tennessee, destroying many homes, displacing
many residents, and creating a sense of chaos for the affected area.
In hindsight, CEO Tom Kilgore and others at the TVA were able to
recognize six points of bifurcation that took them off the established
path and eventually led to the spill (Liska et al., 2012). Most of these
bifurcation points dealt with information siloes and a lack of communication between departments within the organization. Because
they were able to recognize how these bifurcation points put them on
the path to disaster, the organization went through a self-organization
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process and established new procedures and practices that would (it
hoped) prevent the same thing from happening in the future (Liska
et al., 2012). Bifurcation points mark the system’s departure from the
norm and the beginnings of chaos. It is important to recognize these
points and to remember that bifurcation, though highly disruptive to
the system, is temporary.
Strange attractors. Strange attractors are
the fundamental points of connection and order, or lines of force and
influence that exert a continual regulation on the form and behavior
of a system regardless of the specific conditions. They are the points
to which a complex system naturally and continually returns. (Seeger,
2002, p. 334)

Strange attractors are elements that help a system in chaos begin the
process of self-organization and start to emerge from bifurcation. Seeger
said that attractors can take many forms, including family, community,
and economic ties that lead to rebuilding after a disaster. As Freimuth
(2006) said, “an attractor is an organizing principle such as a common
set of values to which a system will return even as it moves through
bifurcation” (p. 145). In this sense, strange attractors are those things
present in the chaotic system that help it find a new order and begin
the process of self-organization. It is because of strange attractors that
a chaotic system begins to move away from bifurcation. Murphy (1996)
referred to attractors as “an inherent shape or state of affairs to which
a phenomenon will always tend to return as it evolves, no matter how
random each single moment may seem” (p. 98). Thus organizations
that experience a crisis that throws them into chaos and bifurcation
should seek out those strange attractors that can help them begin selforganization and moving out of chaos.
Sellnow et al. (2002) described the presence of the National Guard
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) after the
historic Red River floods as embodying the organizing principles that
helped citizens begin to move from bifurcation to self-organization.
As they described it, the presence of these two organizations gave
the confused, disoriented citizens something/someone to look to as
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they began the recovery and rebuilding phase (Sellnow et al., 2002).
Horsley (2014) pointed to a similar strange attractor in her analysis of
the chaos surrounding the D.C.-area sniper attacks. She claimed that
the police chief at the helm of the case, Chief Moose, “personified the
investigation and became a strange attractor” (p. 310). He embodied
the principles of a strange attractor, as he was the one leading the case,
handling the press conferences and media interactions, and using his
position of authority to speak directly to the suspects. His presence was
reassuring and helped give the community a sense that things would
eventually return to normal (Horsley, 2014).
Strange attractors are present before the crisis and will exist after
the crisis. That is why all chaotic systems eventually emerge from bifurcation. However, applying this concept metaphorically to a human
system in crisis allows those strange attractors to manifest in different
forms and be embodied by different individuals or groups. They help a
system begin the process of moving from bifurcation and a cosmology
episode into the process of self-organization that eventually pulls the
system out of chaos. The system that emerges often looks and functions
differently than it did prior to bifurcation because of the changes that
the system underwent during the chaos and self-organization periods,
which will be described later.
Self-organization. Self-organization is often referred to as the “antichaos” mechanism. In the crisis life cycle, this is the point at which
the recovery and renewal phases begin as the system moves away
from chaos/bifurcation and toward stability. Seeger (2002) defined
self-organization as “a natural process whereby order re-emerges out
of the chaotic state brought on through bifurcation. This reordering process is sometimes characterized as the antithesis of chaos and
as the outgrowth or consequence of bifurcation” (p. 332). Wheatley
(2006) described the nature of self-organizing systems as adept and
said that “self-organizing systems are never passive, hapless victims
forced to react to their environments. . . . [The system] uses available
resources more effectively, sustaining and strengthening itself ” (p. 83).
Vicki Freimuth was at the helm of the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) when the 2001 anthrax attacks occurred, and she
described the self-organizing process that the organization had to go
through to handle such an unprecedented event. Though the CDC
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handles disease outbreaks and epidemics regularly, never had such
an instance (what many felt was the first major instance of bioterrorism on American soil) occurred that required such a large response.
Freimuth (2006) described how every part of the CDC communication
branch underwent a change—from the way calls from the public were
received and handled to the way media requests and statements were
handled. In some instances, entire new teams/organizations/structures
needed to be assembled to handle tasks never before handled by the
organization. These emergent structures were created in response
to meet these new needs. As she stated, “the other new structures
created were not modifications of previous ones but were new and
filled gaps made apparent during the anthrax crisis . . . new structures
emerging out of the chaos” (p. 146). Self-organization often results in
the emergence of new structures and organizational policies. Horsley
(2014) also saw this in her analysis of the D.C. sniper shootings. She
described new behaviors, such as citizens standing between car doors
as they pumped gas, schools going into lockdown mode, and people
cancelling extracurricular activities and avoiding going outside unless
absolutely necessary. These behaviors emerged in response to the unique
situation.
For a system experiencing bifurcation to survive, it must go through
the process of self-organization. If this does not occur, the system will
succumb to chaos. To avoid this and reap the benefits of self-organization requires effort; otherwise, the system will dissolve. The nature
of this process is largely dependent on the nature and type of strange
attractors present in the system. When the system partners with its environment, it will develop new capacities that make it more resourceful
and allow it to seek out a new form as a response to the environmental
changes (Wheatley, 2006). Regardless of the nature, self-organization
must occur to get the system back on track. As Wheatley stated,
the viability and resiliency of self-organizing systems comes from its
great capacity to adapt as needed. . . . Neither form nor function alone
dictates how the system is organized. Instead they are process structures,
reorganizing into different forms in order to maintain their identity. . . .
It is capable of organizing into whatever form it determines best suits
the present situation. (p. 82)
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Chaotic systems do not remain in chaos forever because of the process
of self-organization and the presence of strange attractors. In other
words, these systems can be self-healing. Self-organization is not inherent in chaotic systems, however, and sometimes strange attractors
fail to produce the necessary conditions for self-organization to occur.
These concepts are closely related, and they are the reasons why organizations emerge from bifurcation, often looking very different than
they did before the chaos began.
Case Summary

On January 9, 2014, residents of Charleston, West Virginia, and the
surrounding counties began noticing an unusual smell in the air and
in their homes, particularly when the water was running. The first
formal complaint to this effect was registered with the Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) at 8:15 am; however, the West Virginia American Water Company was not made aware of the situation
until noon and, at that time, was under the impression that the water
treatment facility’s carbon filtration system would be able to handle the
problem. However, it soon became apparent that the contamination
exceeded the system’s capabilities, and at 5:45 pm, a full 9.5 hours after
the first complaint was registered with the DEP, a “do not use” ban was
issued to 300,000 customers (Ward & Gutman, 2014).
The source of the contamination was the Freedom Industries plant,
which is located on the banks of the Elk River. This company stores
chemicals for use in the mining, cement, and steel industries. Workers
at the plant noticed a leak coming from a 1-inch hole in a tank that
contained the chemical 4-methylcyclohexylmethanol (MCHM). This
is a chemical used in the coal-cleaning process to remove grit and dirt
from the outside of coal. Employees reported first noticing the leak
at 10:30 am; they reported taking all the appropriate steps to stop the
leak and clean up the damage to the best of their abilities (Ward, 2014).
However, there was nothing to be done about the 7,500 gallons that had
already leaked into the Elk River.
The “do not use” ban instructed the 300,000 affected residents
not to drink, bathe, cook with, or wash with the water. Although this
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information was pertinent for self-protection, because of the almost
10-hour span between the beginning of the contamination and the issuing of the ban, 122 residents had already sought treatment for nausea,
vomiting, and/or diarrhea, which are common symptoms of exposure
to MCHM. By January 14, nearly 700 people had contacted the poison
control hotline reporting symptoms including nausea and rashes, and
14 people were hospitalized (Heyman & Fitzsimmons, 2014).
Authorities began lifting the ban on January 13; however, shortly after
the initial announcement, officials quickly amended the statement based
on recommendations from the CDC to exclude pregnant women and
the immune compromised “out of an abundance of caution” (T. Frieden,
personal communication, January 15, 2014). Before resuming normal
water use, residents were informed that they first needed to flush their
pipes to ensure that all the contaminated water had been cleared out
of their systems (Plummer, 2014). This is where the confusion began,
as clear, explicit instruction on how to properly flush one’s pipes was
not given. For example, how long should the water run? Should I open
my doors and windows while doing this? What about external spigots?
It was also imperative that the residents shut off their hot water heaters before beginning this process, but this instruction was not always
explicit (Whelton et al., 2015). Thus, when people ran their hot water
taps, the MCHM was transformed into a noxious gas that filled people’s
homes, causing headaches, nausea, and nosebleeds. The ambiguity
of the information given only served to heighten uncertainty among
the affected population, precisely the opposite of the intended goal of
emergency/crisis communicators.
Despite the fact that the ban was lifted and all federal aid in the form
of bottled and potable water deliveries had ceased, 6 weeks postcontamination, many residents still refused to drink or use the water in their
homes. When they attempted to resume regular use, the odd smell and
funny taste remained, continuing the distrust in the safety of the water
(Goldenberg, 2014). Besides the obvious frustrations of having to use
bottled water for consumption and for all basic household functions,
West Virginians also faced the added challenge of finding the bottled
water on their own. Most grocery stores and supermarkets could not
keep shelves stocked with water, further complicating matters.
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On July 3, 2014, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) leveled fines against Freedom Industries that totaled $11,000.
The company was fined $7,000 for not having a liquid-tight wall surrounding its tanks and $4,000 for not having standard railings on an
elevated platform (Boucher, 2014). On February 17, 2016, Freedom
Industries’s president, Gary Southern, was sentenced to 30 days in jail
and was ordered to pay a $20,000 fine for his negligence and role in
the Elk River spill. Four other Freedom Industries officials received
probation-only sentences (Ward, 2016a).
Method

Because of the time and attention paid by the researcher, this study
qualifies as a robust and in-depth case study of an event. According to
Yin (2013), a case study approach is most appropriate when three conditions are met: the main research questions are “how” and “why,” the
researcher has little to no control over behavioral events, and the focus
of the study is a contemporary rather than a historical phenomenon.
Others who have applied chaos theory to crises have employed this
interpretive method as well (Horsley, 2014; Liska et al., 2012; Sellnow
et al., 2002).
This was a public crisis that elicited a response from organizations
at the local, state, and federal levels. From the outset, there was a large
amount of uncertainty surrounding the case. Though the spill and
subsequent water ban only lasted approximately 2 weeks, the consequences of the event were felt for more than 2 years. Because of its
impact, the event garnered national news coverage, in addition to the
large amount of social media activity surrounding it, creating a large
body of data for exploration. These characteristics, combined with the
observable behavior of individuals and groups in response to this event,
make it optimal for study from a social science case study perspective.
According to Yin (2013),
whatever the field of interest, the distinctive need for case study arises
out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena. . . . A case
study allows investigators to focus on a “case” and retain a holistic and
real-world perspective. (p. 4)
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Tracking of this event began the week after the spill happened and
has continued for the 3 years following. The case was tracked by observing the traditional media and new media for updates about the unfolding
event. This case differed from other cases in which chaos theory has
been applied because the established organizations were either absent
from the crisis response or failed to provide useful information and
pertinent messages for self-protection in a timely manner. Thus affected
citizens turned to other sources for information. These sources took
the form of emergent organizations using social media. To identify
emergent organizations, the following definition was employed: an
organization that did not exist prior to the contamination of the Elk
River on January 9, 2014, but was formed in response to that event and
used some form of information communication technology to carry
out the majority of its functions. Using this definition, the tracking
process revealed five emergent organizations: three Facebook pages,
a blog, and a Twitter account. The content posted to these sites was
closely tracked in addition to coverage of the spill in traditional media.
These two sources provided ample data for constructing a rich case
description, which Yin (2013) described as an “analysis organized on the
basis of description of the general characteristics and relations of the
phenomenon in question” (p. 5). Tracking of this case was undertaken
with the goal of understanding the complex interactions surrounding
this spill and its implications for those affected.
Analysis

Chaos theory holds that systems act in nonlinear and unpredictable
ways (Murphy, 1996). Chaos theory comprises several components:
sensitivity to initial conditions, bifurcation, fractals, strange attractors,
and self-organization. Each of these plays a part in the life cycle of a
system in chaos. As has been established, an organization experiencing a crisis is an excellent fit for the metaphorical application of chaos
theory (Seeger, 2002). The West Virginia water crisis is no exception.
There are unique facets of this incident that align clearly with the tenets
of chaos theory and demonstrate how this system experienced several
points of bifurcation and descended into chaos before strange attractors
appeared and spurred the process of self-organization and anti-chaos.
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Sensitivity to Initial Conditions

Because of a system’s sensitivity to initial conditions (i.e., the butterfly
effect), simple things that might seem insignificant (like the flapping
of a butterfly’s wings) can have a much larger impact on the system
(Murphy, 1996). For example, in the West Virginia crisis, the hole that
developed in the bottom of the tank was not due to corrosion from
the chemical it held but rather from rainwater that entered through
the top of the tank. According to Chemical Safety Board inspectors,
“corrosion from water pooling inside the leaky tank likely caused the
holes. The substances traveled through soil, gravel and water systems
under the Freedom site before hitting the Elk River” (Mattise, 2014).
Thus two commonplace natural phenomena (rainwater and freezing
temperatures) set off a chain of events that resulted in the largest drinking water contamination in American history at that time.
The proximity of the plant to the Elk River, Freedom Industries’s
lax attitude toward safety, the absence of a proper plant safety inspection in more than 20 years, the unfortunate trajectory of the chemical
flowing toward the river, and the use of the river as a drinking water
source all combined to create a complex system with a greater potential
for bifurcation. Systems/organizations with higher levels of complexity
are more susceptible to instability and are more likely to experience
crises (Seeger, 2002). This is precisely what happened to the complex
system in West Virginia.
Bifurcation

Bifurcations are the points at which the larger system begins to deviate from the norm and head down another path (Murphy, 1996). It is
at these points that the system begins its descent into chaos. In West
Virginia, there are several points of bifurcation to note. The point at
which the hole developed in the bottom of the storage tank marks
the beginning of the problems. Obviously, these tanks are meant to
contain the chemicals, so the failure to do so marks a departure from
the norm. When the DEP officials arrived at the scene, they described
what they saw at tank 396:
They found a 400-square-foot pool of chemical that had leaked from
the tank into a block containment area. Pressure from the material leak-
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ing out of the tank created what DEP officials called an “up-swelling,”
or an artesian well, like a fountain of chemical coming up from the
pool. (Ward, 2014)

Because of the dike failure, the chemical flowed freely into the Elk
River, and “they saw a 4-foot-wide stream of chemicals heading for
the containment area’s wall, and disappearing into the joint between
the dike’s wall and floor” (Ward, 2014). At this point, several changes
in the direction and structure of the system resulted in bifurcation and
a departure from standard operating procedures. The chaotic system
grew when the West Virginia American Water Company decided to
issue the “do not use” order to 300,000 of its customers. The failures at
the Freedom Industries site combined with the contamination of the
Elk River and with it the drinking water supply for a major city created
a chaotic environment and marked the point of bifurcation.
The issuing of the “do not use” ban also marks a cosmology episode
for the affected residents. Cosmology episodes are a condition spurred
by bifurcation. They occur when a person is in uncharted territory,
does not know how to respond to this unknown situation, and does
not know where to seek help. Weick (1993) described these incidents
as a collapse in sense making and noted that individuals typically make
sense of events by comparing them to past events. However, crises are
unique events that often do not bear much resemblance to prior events.
Instead of feeling déjà vu (I feel like I have been here before), a cosmology episode causes feelings of vu jade (I have never been here before).
For the 300,000 residents, it is highly unlikely that many (if any) had
experienced a water ban like this before. One West Virginia resident,
identified only as Sarah, said, “In all my 25 years of life this is the first
time I have ever had to deal with something like this” (Bryson, 2014).
Another affected resident, Nate Halstead, was quoted in a Washington
Post article: “I drank a 32-ounce glass of it right before they put it on
TV . . . I don’t know what to do, honestly” (Achenbach, 2014). Boil
water advisories are more common and are easier to contend with
than a complete and total inability to use the water in the home for
any purpose other than flushing the toilet. Thus this was likely a new
and unsettling situation the stakeholders found themselves in and one
that caused great uncertainty and left them with few options of where
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to turn for answers. In addition to affected residents, those involved
in the response were also blindsided because “there was no testing
method immediately available to determine how much MCHM was
in the water, and no limit set by any regulatory agency or public health
official for how much of the material was dangerous” (Ward, 2016b).
This was unfamiliar territory and complicated the response efforts, as
decision makers had no previous experience to guide them and were
unsure where to begin.
Approximately 10 days after it had been introduced, officials began
lifting the “do not use” ban. Affected residents were told it was safe
to resume normal water use as long as they flushed their pipes for a
certain amount of time to ensure the stagnant contaminated water was
cleaned out of the system. People followed the instructions that were
given by the established organizations. However, even after flushing,
they found that their water still had a funny smell and odd taste. This
instance of a prescribed intervention failing to yield the desired results
represents another bifurcation point. Because the odd smell and taste
lingered, many people chose to continue using bottled water and did
not resume normal use of their tap water as the established organizations had expected them to do. Resident Melanie Kipp said,
Even after flushing, the water continued to smell like MCHM and
whatever other chemicals were in the mix. It left an oily film on dishes
and the skin. We continued to avoid it. Showering resumed, but they
were quick and followed with a final rinse of heated bottled water.
(Gerken, 2015)

These signs were obvious to stakeholders and were clear indicators that
problems persisted, despite reassurances from established organizations. What was meant to be the point at which things began to return
to normal actually became a point at which things continued in chaos.
Fractals

A third component of chaos theory is the idea of fractals. Fractals are
concerned with the measurement of systems and are the larger observable patterns within the overall system (Murphy, 1996). Fractals are
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sometimes difficult to observe and are largely dependent on perception.
When the DEP alerted the West Virginia American Water Company
to this chemical contamination around noon, it was initially
working under the assumption that it was a flocculent, common in
water treatment. Officials there did not learn the correct identity of the
chemical until two hours later. . . . The company’s standard and emergency water treatments are applicable to chemicals commonly found in
water and were not effective on the chemical that leaked. (Ward, 2014)

Because these decisions were based on a pattern and measurement that
only applies in normal operating conditions, they did not recognize
the abnormal conditions created by a system experiencing bifurcation.
Relying on standard operating procedures is largely ineffective in a
chaotic system. It was not until several hours later, after observing the
failure of the filtration system to operate effectively in these abnormal
conditions, that the company recognized its error in judgment and issued the “do not use” ban. Unfortunately, the amount of time that had
elapsed before people were warned meant a greater number of people
were exposed to this chemical.
A second example of reliance on an imprecise measure revolves
around the creation of an acceptable threshold for MCHM in drinking water. No such threshold existed prior to this event; thus the CDC
and several other organizations worked together to quickly come up
with a recommendation for an acceptable level of MCHM in drinking
water. The original recommendation the team gave was one part per
million (Ward, 2014). However, after publicly announcing that as an
appropriate level, they had to quickly amend that statement to exclude
pregnant women, infants, and the immune compromised “out of an
abundance of caution” (T. Frieden, personal communication, January 15,
2014). The CDC made this initial recommendation based on a study
done on rats by the Eastman Kodak Company in 1990 (Zwerdling,
2014). But Lynn Goldman, the former director of the Environmental
Protection Agency’s toxic chemical division, said there was not sufficient
data to make a recommendation. A major issue with the study was
that
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it looked only at how MCHM might affect adults, in this case by testing it on grown rats. The researchers didn’t consider how the chemical
might affect fetuses or newborns. . . . A lot of chemicals that don’t hurt
adults can wreak havoc on the young. (Zwerdling, 2014)

This is the same issue experienced by officials making predictions
about the flood levels for the Red River, who used the traditional
measurement methods without accounting for the sensitivity to initial
conditions. As Sellnow et al. (2002) stated, “the key problem associated with fractals in this case involved the communication of excessive
confidence in a measurement system that lacked the precision needed”
(p. 276). This was also the issue in West Virginia and was compounded
by the fact that little was known about MCHM, as it had never been
the culprit in a contamination event like this one. Because of the time
constraints and the lack of any preexisting test to measure MCHM
levels in drinking water, the teams charged with creating such a test
made the mistake of relying on imprecise measures, which ultimately
did more harm than good and exacerbated the uncertainty surrounding
the situation.
Strange Attractors

Strange attractors are those things which “emphasize order and pattern
within chaos. An attractor is an organizing principle such as a common
set of values to which a system will return even as it moves through a
bifurcation” (Freimuth, 2006, p. 145). For as much as a system is sensitive to initial conditions and seemingly minuscule events can cause
it to descend into chaos, it is also susceptible to the presence of those
things that cause it to move out of bifurcation and toward a more organized and less chaotic state. Strange attractors can take many forms.
However, in West Virginia, no immediately observable force provided
the reassurance necessary for the affected stakeholders to move toward
a sense of normalcy. Freedom Industries had closed its doors, and
its officials refused to cooperate with the media or investigators and
never offered an official apology. The West Virginia American Water
Company was focused on shifting blame, constantly reminding stakeholders that it was not the source of the spill and, therefore, was just
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as much a victim of Freedom Industries as they were. While its lack of
fault for the spill is true, the victims were looking for answers and help
getting clean water, not more corporate blame shifting. As for the state
government, it, too, failed to meet the needs of the people. In a notable
and cringe-worthy press conference on January 12, 2014, Governor
Earl Ray Tomblin fumbled and failed to provide satisfactory answers
to questions about how the spill happened and what was being done
to make it right (Vingiano, 2014). Again, an established organization
that should have been prepared to handle the event more effectively
proved to be incapable of doing so.
When Governor Tomblin and President Obama declared an emergency at the state and federal level, respectively, the affected area was
given access to special funds and services set aside for use in such a
disaster. Immediately following these declarations, the National Guard
arrived on-site with tanker trucks full of potable water and other supplies. Additionally, FEMA was dispatched to the area. These organizations worked alongside local FEMA and Red Cross chapters to distribute
water and provide necessary aid to the victims. According to a FEMA
spokesperson, it provided approximately 7 million liters of water and
130,000 meals during the initial response (Marks, 2014). When the
water company began lifting the “do not use” ban and provided flushing
instructions, this signaled the end of acute phase of the crisis. However,
as was described previously, people found that even after following the
flushing guidelines, the water still had the funny smell and taste that
were present at the outset of the crisis. Therefore they continued to
distrust the water and sought alternative sources for water. However,
a new obstacle was now introduced, because the National Guard and
other relief organizations had left the area. When the water company
proclaimed the water to be safe again and the “do not use” order was
lifted, so, too, were the emergency declarations put in place by Governor
Tomblin and President Obama. Thus the state’s access to disaster relief
funds and the reassuring presence of FEMA and the National Guard
and their trucks full of bottled water had vanished. At this point, the
chaotic system experienced another period of bifurcation, and the organizations that could have functioned as strange attractors and created
points of self-organization were no longer present in the system. Those
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affected found themselves with a set of unique needs precipitated by a
crisis that those in power felt was no longer an issue.
Self-Organization

Self-organization is referred to as the anti-chaos mechanism. It is the
antithesis of bifurcation. It is because of self-organization that a system
in chaos does not remain in chaos indefinitely. One cannot discuss
self-organization without discussing strange attractors. According to
the literature, self-organization cannot happen without the presence of
strange attractors in the system. Eventually, for the system to move out
of bifurcation, the strange attractors present within the system must
begin the self-organization process (Seeger, 2002). In West Virginia,
the self-organization process happened in a unique way. Typically,
established organizations express the values that represent strange attractors. However, the established organizations in West Virginia failed
to do this and therefore did not spur the self-organization process. To
compensate for this, West Virginians self-organized in such a way as
to represent these strange attractor values and become the catalyst
for self-organization. While this sounds redundant, when one takes a
closer look at the emergent organizations that formed in the wake of
the crisis, it becomes clearer the role they played in moving the chaotic
system away from bifurcation and toward self-organization.
Because affected stakeholders could not rely on the established
organizations to do their part, nor could they rely on the reassuring
presence of the relief organizations, they had to find alternate ways to
respond and create order within the chaotic system. They did this by
self-organizing into emergent organizations that performed a variety
of relief functions and worked to meet the previously unmet needs of
the affected stakeholders. They harnessed the power of social media
and other information communication technologies to form quickly
and coordinate efforts for maximum effectiveness. One of these groups,
the WV Clean Water Hub (n.d.), created a Facebook page. The “About”
section describes its purpose:
We have been coordinating deliveries of water and needed supplies
through direct response to requests from community members as well
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as establishing relationships with particular communities in need . . .
and we are working with community leaders to see how we can help
address the long-term needs of the community.

This is just one example of several groups that emerged in the
wake of this crisis to fill a variety of unmet needs within the affected
community. These groups, usually through the connective power of
social media and information communication technologies, provided
necessary information and instructions for self-protection, solicited
donations of supplies, and disseminated supplies among victims. These
activities were necessary for those affected not only to get the water
they desperately needed but also to feel like there was a proverbial light
at the end of the tunnel. These roles were no longer being filled by the
relief organizations and were being ignored by the established organizations; therefore the emergence and presence of these organizations
was the driving force behind the self-organization process in the West
Virginia water crisis.
Chaos theory has been applied to a number of different crisis events,
and this case represents another instance where the tenets of chaos
theory are present through the crisis life cycle. This application builds
on the existing body of literature and extends it to a new crisis type.
When the tank at Freedom Industries began leaking on the morning
of January 9, 2014, it marked the first in a series of departures from the
norm that would put this system into chaos and a point of bifurcation.
Because the established organizations were largely unaware of these
points of bifurcation, they failed to respond appropriately or effectively.
On two occasions, a failure of perspective caused them to misread the
fractal patterns and rely on imprecise measures. The first occasion was
when the water company learned that its water uptake source had been
contaminated but did not shut the system down because it felt the purification system would be sufficient to handle the contamination. This
was later to prove to be an incorrect assumption. The second instance
occurred when the CDC, working in conjunction with the National
Guard and the water company, made an initial recommendation of
one part per million as an appropriate threshold for MCHM in drinking water. Further research proved this to be imprecise and incorrect.
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Thus the CDC amended its recommendation to be one part per billion.
However, the damage to its credibility was already done, and people
continued to distrust the water and rely on alternate sources. This kept
the system in bifurcation rather than moving it toward self-organization,
which was contrary to the goals of the organizations.
Strange attractors are common values and points of organization to
which a system in chaos is naturally drawn. The established organizations usually represent these values, and they provide stakeholders with
a sense of order and the reassurance of an eventual return to normal.
In West Virginia, the established organizations failed to represent these
values and sense of order. Freedom Industries failed to cooperate and
offer any helpful information or even a simple apology. The water company failed to acknowledge the lack of normal operating procedures
and made several missteps that sent the system back into bifurcation.
Though the National Guard and FEMA were able to provide relief for a
short period of time, they left the system before order was restored and
the crisis had ended. Because of these failings, it fell to the stakeholders
to take on this role. Motivated by community ties and strong values,
they self-organized into emergent groups and became the strange attractors that spurred the system toward self-organization and away from
bifurcation. They represented the strange attractor values and provided
the much-needed sense of order. Because of this, they connected as
strange attractors and precipitated self-organization.
Conclusion

Organizations that experience a crisis fit the model of a system in chaos.
The body of literature cited herein shows its successful application to
a number of different crisis events, from natural disasters to criminal
activity (Freimuth, 2006; Horsley, 2014; Liska et al., 2012; Sellnow &
Seeger, 2001). However, this case is the first application of chaos theory
to an environmental contamination event of this nature and the first
application to a water contamination crisis. Thus this work builds on the
existing body of literature and applies the theory in a new context. This
case also highlights a situation in which a system did not “right itself ”
through modes of self-organization seen in previous cases but rather
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required the intervention of important stakeholder groups to spur that
process. This case could serve as an example to others experiencing a
crisis who feel that established organizations are not doing their part to
move the system from bifurcation to self-organization. The actions of
the West Virginia residents provide a good model for others to follow
if they find themselves in a similar situation, as the citizens of Flint,
Michigan, did. Their water was contaminated not by an accidental spill
but rather due to negligence in the water treatment process, allowing
the water to be contaminated with high levels of lead. As this case drew
more media attention, citizen groups formed in response to the crisis,
and several groups in West Virginia have posted messages of solidarity
on social media. This is one example, but it demonstrates the potential
for stakeholders in the midst of a chaotic system to become participants
in the self-healing process.
In the same vein, for relief organizations and those called to respond
to a crisis, this case shows the willingness of certain stakeholders to be
involved in their own recovery process. It could be beneficial for all to
expand their view of the affected population from simply being “victims”
who require service and aid to realize that some could be willing to be
active participants in the response. Having additional hands on deck to
help with the many tasks necessitated by a crisis is helpful, but the local
knowledge and connections that these people bring to the table can
prove invaluable to those coming from the outside to provide assistance.
From the moment the hole developed in the bottom of the tank at
Freedom Industries, a chain of events and points of bifurcation began
that set the system into chaos. When the water company issued the
“do not use” ban to its 300,000 customers, it created a large amount of
uncertainty and fear for those individuals. Given that most, if not all,
had not experienced a water ban of this magnitude before, they most
likely experienced a collapse in sense making. Weick (1993) referred to
this as a cosmology episode, because people experience the feeling of
having never been in that situation before and having no idea where
to turn for answers.
Fractals allow the observer to see the overlying patterns in an otherwise chaotic and disordered system. However, observing the pattern
is difficult if one relies on an imprecise measurement system. This was
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the case in West Virginia on two occasions. First, the water company
failed to issue the “do not use” ban immediately after learning of the
contamination because it assumed the filtration system would take care
of the problem. However, this failed to realize the absence of normal
operating conditions due to the system experiencing bifurcation. The
second failure occurred when the team charged with creating an acceptable recommended threshold for MCHM in drinking water made
an initial recommendation of one part per million. The team quickly
retracted this recommendation when they realized it did not take into
account the safety of pregnant women, small children, and the elderly.
After adopting a more precise measurement tool, they made a new
recommendation of one part per billion.
Strange attractors and self-organization go hand in hand in a chaotic
system. Strange attractors are those things present within the system
that spur the self-organization (anti-chaos) process. In previous studies,
strange attractor values have been expressed by official relief organizations, such as FEMA and the National Guard or a top law enforcement
official (Horsley, 2014; Sellnow et al., 2002). In West Virginia, the established relief organizations and top officials who should have led the
response and functioned as strange attractors failed to perform their
duties effectively. Therefore the system had to create other strange
attractors to pull itself out of chaos. This process occurred through
self-organization among the concerned citizens and victims themselves.
Future Directions

The application of chaos theory to organizations in crisis is a budding
area of research that calls for more widespread use and careful observation. Particularly, this study calls for more exploration of the selforganization component of chaos theory and how crisis communication
messages can help or hinder that process. Observing messages that are
successful at meeting the informational needs of stakeholders and how
they can move the system away from bifurcation can strengthen the
link between effective communication and self-organization.
The MCHM contamination of the Elk River created a crisis for the
300,000 affected residents whose health and well-being were threatened
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and daily routines were upended by this event. The unique characteristics of the event made it ideal for studying from a crisis communication and chaos theory perspective. This in-depth case study adds to
the growing body of crisis communication literature using chaos as a
theoretical lens, and it is the first to focus on a crisis in the form of a
water contamination. This study also contributes to the literature by
closely examining how a chaotic system moves from bifurcation toward
self-organization when established organizations fail to exhibit the
values of strange attractors.
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